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THE STORY OF PINOCCHIO:
NOW I'M A REAL BOY
THERESA A. GABALDON *
Abstract; Corporate responsibility' has become a matter of great concern
after the Enron and WorldCom scandals rocked corporate culture. This
Article suggests that corporate irresponsibility stems from the failure of
corporations to address the concerns of non-shareholders and the failure
of shareholders and regulatory watchdogs to look beneath the corporate
surface. Competing schools of thought, such as neoclassical economics,
progressive corporate theory, and outsider corporate theory, offer
divergent analyses of the corporate responsibility dilemma. Regulatory
responses to the crisis of corporate conscience remain untested. This
Article suggests that our failure to foresee corporate irresponsibility partly
comes from over on traditional theories of shareholder primacy.
Change is unlikely to come from within the corporation, so regulators
must look beyond the board of directors to ensure responsible manage-
ment. This Article proposes criminal liability for corporate indifference to
the health and well-being of foreseeable victims of corporate irrespon-
sibility.
Prove yourself brave, truthful, and unselfish, and someday you will be a
real boy.
—PoroccHlo (Walt Disney Studios 1940)
INTRODUCTION
The wind has changed. Recent years have seen a steady growth of
concern, both in academia and otherwise, about corporate social re-
sponsibility.' Corporations either were to be tweaked or reengineered
until their use of foreign and domestic labor became non-exploitative,
* Professor of Law and Carville Dickinson Benson Research Professor of Law, George
Washington University, B.S. 1975, University of Arizona, ID. 1978, Harvard. The author
would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the research assistance of Bryan Sillaman and
Jason Wyrick, the inspiration of William T Palmer, the insights and efforts of Robert L.
Palmer, and the comments of Mitu Gulati and his class at Georgetown Law Center.
For a discussion and suMmary of this trend, see, for example, Marianne M. Jennings
& Jon Entine, Business with a Soul: A Reexamination of What Counts in Business Ethics, 20
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoCr 1, 3 (1998) and Colloquium, Corporate Citizenship: A Conversa-
tion Among the Law, Business and Academia, 84 MAN. L. REV, 723, 724-25 (2001).
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their use of test animals was eliminated, and their products became
one hundred percent safe and effective. 2 These were years in which
an aura of corporate plenty allowed the luxury of speculation about—
if not a corporate soul—a corporate consciences We were fat and we
were happy, and we were willing to entertain the thought of sharing
our good fortune.
In a few short months, focus shifted from the prospect of creating
a kinder, gentler corporation to something, how shall we say, more
elemental. As some would have it, we are now concerned with matters
of survival. 4 We now ask not how to share wealth, but how to prevent
corporate managers from making it appear as a mirage in the desert.
The explanation for this change is obvious. We believe that con-
science is a luxury afforded only after self-preservation is assured. The
queasiness about financial well-being created when some of the air
escaped from the overheated financial markets turned to outright
nausea when Enron, WorldCom, and Qwest made their unhappy dis-
closures about the true state of their balance sheets and business af-
fairs.' We are obsessed with counting the coins in the corporate pock-
etbook, saving for some later date the niceties of who might have
been hurt to put them there.
This Article takes the position that this occasion for introspection
can be put to multiple uses. As we contemplate the integrity of corpo-
rate accounting statements, we can continue to contemplate the fair-
ness of corporate actions. As we do so, it may appear that strategies for
assuring that corporate managers neither lie about nor steal corpo-
rate assets also are helpful in preserving the environment, improving
the lives of workers, and enhancing product quality. In this Article,
concerns such as these will be referred to as "matters of conscience."
When the perceived crisis in corporate integrity affected overall
market levels, regulators leapt to respond. Since mid-2002, the New
York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE") has implemented requirements
that its listed companies have boards of directors with independent
majorities;' have audit committees composed entirely of independent
2 See Jennings & Entine, supra note 1, at 5-7.
3 See id. at 9.
4 See Simon Deakin, Squaring the Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity in the U.K, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 976,986-87 (2002).
5 See, e.g., Dennis Hastert, Bush Leading Us Back to Fiscal Recovery, CIIi. Tim., Jan. 10,
2003, at N21; Mike Ivey, No Doubt, Markets Need a Positive; Analyst Zempel Remains Bullish,
CAPITAL TIMES,Jan. 23,2003, at 1E.
6 Sec N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303(A) (1) (2003) [hereinafter
NYSE MANUAL] (addressing corporate governance standards); Self-Regulatory Organiza-
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directors with the sole power to hire and fire the corporation's out-
side auditor;7 implement equity-based compensation plans, including
those involving stock options, only after shareholder approval; 8 pro-
vide chief executive officer ("CEO") certification of financial state-
ments;9 and adopt corporate ethics codes, a feature of which must be
protection for whistleblowers.I° The Securities Exchange Commission
(the "SEC"), acting under the auspices of its preexisting investigative
authority, has required CEO certification of the financial statements
of the largest companies with registered securities" and has imposed
expedited schedules for filing various disclosure documents under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "`34 Act"),I 2 Congress has
adopted a reform act enshrining a new regulatory scheme for corpo-
rate auditors,I 5 requiring that corporations have specifically composed
audit committees," altering disclosure requirements for corporate
attorneys,' 5 providing protection and a remedy for whistleblowers,I 0
heightening penalties for wire and mail fraud,I 7 establishing a new
crime of securities frand,I 8 and a new crime for destruction of evi-
dence, 19 prohibiting loans to insiders,20 requiring CEO certification of
financial statements, 21 forbidding trading in company securities by
insiders during periods in which rank-and-file employees are unable
Lions; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-47672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051, 19,052 (Apr. 17, 2003).
7 See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 303(A) (7).
8 Id. § 303(A) (8); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate Ef-
fectiveness of Proposed Rule Change, by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc, Extending the
Pilot Regarding Shareholder Approval of Stock Option Plans Through June 30, 2003, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-47409, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,560, 10,560 (Mar. 5, 2003).
9 See NYSE MANUAL, snpra note 6, § 303(A) (12).
18 Id. § 303(A) (10).
11 Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a) (1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Order 4-460 ( June 27, 2002).
12 Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-46084, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,914, 42,914 (Jute 25, 2002).
See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107.204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A.).
14 Id. § 301.
15 Id. § 307.
16 Id. § 806.
17 Id. § 903.
18 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807.
19 Id. § 802.
29 Id. § 402.
21 Id. § 302.
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to trade in such securities through their 401(k) plans, 22 extending the
statutes of limitations for the exercise of private rights under the '34
Act, 23 forcing disclosure of the existence or absence of ethics codes,24
and calling for real-time disclosure of developments that might affect
a company's financial healt11. 23
Such a flood of activity raises obvious questions. Are the ostensi-
ble changes long overdue? Are they individually well taken? Are they
coherent overall? Do they amount to meaningful refOrm, or are they
simply a matter of appearance? Is there really a difference? This Arti-
cle addresses these questions only briefly and asks if one of these re-
forms could be utilized—in essence, piggybacked—for matters of
conscience.
Part I of this Article describes various perspectives from which
these questions can be addressed." Neoclassical economic and pro-
gressive corporate law approaches, including team production and
behavioral economics, promise to provide divergent assessments of
such issues as whether meddling in a corporation's "internal affairs" is
an appropriate form of regulation, and what relationships exist be-
tween financial health, corporate fairness and/or social conscience,
and corporate philanthropy.27 Feminist and critical race (collectively
referred to as "outsider") perspectives provide assessments that are
more divergent still."
Part II presents a brief explanation of how public perception of
the relative importance of various corporate law issues has been skewed
by recent market events. 29 It includes an inquiry into the role of public
perception in motivating corporate agents to misrepresent the entity's
financial status and in inspiring regulators to respond." This inquiry
leads to speculation about the validity of shareholder primacy as a goal
of state corporate law and its relationship to shareholder protection as
a goal of federal securities law 31 Part II concludes that the collective
role of shareholders of public corporations is a fiction—a construct,
22 r § 306.
23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 804.
21 Id. § 406.
25 Id. § 409.
26 Sec infra notes 43-89 and accompanying text.
2' Sec infra notes 43-69 and accompanying text.
211 Sec infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 90-139 and accompanying text.
30 Sec infra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 112-139 and accompanying text.
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and an unnecessary one at thatbut one that is unlikely to change. 32
Recognizing both of these aspects can play a crucial role for the pro-
ponents of corporate conscience." Among other things, it leads to the
realization that if shareholder primacy is not the desired or necessary
goal of corporate law, and if shareholders as traditionally conceived do
not really exist, any reliance on shareholders for reform and/or en-
forcement probably is misdirected. 34
Part III returns to the subject. of recent regulatory responses to
the perceived crisis in corporate integrity." In evaluating these re-
sponses, this Part integrates a discussion of neoclassical, progressive,
and outsider perspectives; the distinction between regulation of a
corporation's "internal affairs" and regulation of its interfaces with
the external world (sometimes referred to in this Article as the "in-
ternal/external" distinction); and shareholder primacy goals." It also
refers to the financial health/conscience/philanthropy continuum in
speculating about whether integrity reforms may be useful in achiev-
ing broader conscience goals. 37
Part IV describes an additional approach for adjusting and/or re-
structuring relevant laws in order to address matters of conscience," It
examines the proposition that regulation external to corporate law may
be at least as good a tool for achieving desired results as is regulating a
corporation's "internal affairs," and makes the point that. the tradi-
tional internal/external distinction is, at this moment in time, very
much up for grabs." It develops, in particular, a proposal based on
criminal law, discussing in detail the tailoring of suitable penalties and
their anticipated effect on corporate constituents. 4° Finally, Part IV
speculates about the broader market effects of this proposal.'"
Detailed overview notwithstanding, the content of this Article can
be described much more simply. It is, as its title suggests, about Pinoc-
chio—an artificial being, one with occasional truth problems, one
that occasionally is led astray. 42 It is about evil impresarios, loving fa-
32 See infra notes 120-139 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 120-139 and accompanying text.
34 Sec infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
35 Sec infra notes 140-159 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 140-159 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
311 See infra notes 160-201 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
12 PINOCCItio {Walt Disney Studios 1940).
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tilers, and crickets. It is about puppets and real boys. It is about the
quest for humanity, for which the intervention of conscience is neces-
sary. And yes, it is about magic, of which belief is a necessary part.
I. THE VIEW IS DIFFERENT FROM OVER HERE
A. The Players
1. The Traditionalists
As a matter of tradition, corporations have been regarded as
fictional entities—at worst, as Frankenstein's monster, and, at best, as
the initial animation of Pinocchio. 43 It has proven eye-catching and
convenient to regulate corporations pursuant to the assumption that if
their internal workings are set in motion by human beings complying
with the corporate laws regulating "internal affairs," then they may be
treated as if they were real human beings as a matter of "external" law."
Although decades of academic commentary have treated this view
more as something to react to than to endorse, 45 it unarguably has had
tremendous impact in actual law making and in shaping approaches
to the question of what comprises "internal" corporate law. 47
In contemplating the traditionally viewed "internal" structure of
the corporate entity, it is useful to note that different groups play
43 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Lim-
ited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1391-92 (1992); see alto Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206; Larry E, Rib-
stein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV. 95, 97-100
(1995); sec also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. V. Woodward, 17 U.S. (44 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(describing the corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law").
45 See William W. Britton, Jr., The Nero Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475, 1480-81 (1989); Michael Jensen & William Meckling,
The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior; Agency Costs, and Ownership Pri ?triples, 3 . 1. FIN. ECON.
305, 311 (1976) (stating that the corporation is a "nexus of contracts*); David Millon, Corn-
munitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPO-
RATE LAW 3-4 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (rejecting the "nexus of contracts" approach
in favor of a "communitarian" approach),
46 See Millon, supra note 44, at 206 (noting that courts frequently have interpreted stat-
utes containing the word "persons" to include corporations); see, e.g., Loudon v. Coleman, 59
Ga. 653, 655 (1877); People ex rd. Bank of Watertown v. Assessors of Watertown, 1 Hill 616,
620-21 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 1841); Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, 355 (1860).
47 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461,
1461 (1989); Lawrence E. Mitchell, .4 Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REv.
1263, 1263 (1992).
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roles that are understood easily by analogy to the human body. Thus,
it is clear that the brain of the corporation, responsible for making or
supervising the decisions necessary for the management of its affairs,
is the board of directors. 48 The functioning limbs of the corporation
are its agents, including its officers. There has been, however, some
tug-of-war in the understanding of the role of shareholders, who
most often appear to be the stomach, or appetite, of the entity, less
frequently moderating their own appetites with an appearance as the
corporate conscience.
2. The Contractarians
Contractarians have tended to reject the traditional "corporation
as fictional human" imagery and have characterized the corporation as
a "nexus of contracts" among self-interested capital providers, manag-
ers, employees, and others. 49 Contractarians frequently characterize the
"best," or "most efficient," corporate law as providing the "best," or
"most efficient," set of default contract rules—those that the parties
would negotiate for themselves most frequently, but which still may be
negotiated around." These rules, which may be characterized as com-
prising "internal" corporate law," accept the assumption that managers
are agents for shareholders and thus, are responsible for maximizing
the residual value of the firm remaining after (Alter claimants have
been satisfied.52 This assumption generally leads to the conclusion that
the interests of shareholders are preferred over those of others with
interests in the firm—a conclusion often referred to as the "share-
holder primacy" model." Notwithstanding shareholder primacy, con-
tractarian analyses of corporate functioning typically, but not inevitably,
. 15 Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: OK How Can We
Identib a Corporate Morality, 76 Tut.. L. REV. 1645, 1657 (2002).
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 45, at 310-11; sec also FRANK H. EASTERPROOK &
DANIEL K. F1SC1IEL, TILE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE or CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991); Henry W.
Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 99, 99, 100 (1989).
5° Sec EASTERRROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 34; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 45,
at 311.
51 See Bratton, supra note 45, at 1480 (stating that the contractual model implies a lim-
ited role for corporate law). Note, however, that these arrangements include the hypo-
thetical bargain between consumer and shareholders conferring limited liability on share-
holders.
52 See 17.As•ratn!wrix & Frscit EL, supra note 49, at 35-39.
53 Sec Lynn A. Stout. Bad and Not-So-Bad Atguntents for Shateholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV, 1189, 1193 (2002).
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concede that corporations should comply with external law, and that
this external law properly may take account of public goals. 54
The Progressives
If one is inclined to question neoclassical economic analysis,
which attempts to explain the utilitarianism of corporate culture and
its enabling structures, then the management/shareholder relation-
ship is a good place to start. Shareholder primacy is, perhaps, the
most obvious point on which neoclassical economic and progressive
corporate analysts tend to diverge.55 Corporate progressives generally
attempt to devise methods of setting more places at the table—for
expanding the goals of the corporation and the duties of manage-
ment (most. notably the board of directors) to encompass notions of
responsibility to other constituents, including broad-based society. 5° It
is, however, the corporation's routine interactions with workers, the
environment, and so forth that most typically are raised by those with
corporate conscience concerns.57 The inside/outside paradigm usu-
ally is not questioned; rather, the progressive focus is on expanding
the internal coverage of corporate law 58 Thus, progressives often ar-
gue for the recognition of fiduciary duties running from directors to
groups such as creditors and employees, with, of course, correspond-
ing private enforcement rights to police these duties. 59
It is easy to understand, from the progressive perspective, why
little attention needs to he devoted to "external" law. This is because
only those who have no interactions with a corporation or its products
are likely to be regarded as non-stakeholders. It should be noted,
moreover, that because those presently or prospectively affected by
51 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 37-39.
55 For arguments in support of shareholder primacy, see Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32;
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 45, at 306. For arguments against shareholder primacy, see
Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate LOW, 50 Wnsn. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1714
(1993); Millon, supra note 45, at 1-2.
66 See, e.g., •ai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed
Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 Count. J.L. & Soc. Noss. 587.
591 (1997); Milton, supra note 44, at 238.
57 See, e.g., Marlene O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recogniz-
ing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1246 (1991).
59 See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1263.
" See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.V.U. L.
REV. 1165, 1168-70 (1990) (arguing that fiduciary rights should be extended to corporate
bondholders); O'Conno•, supra note 57, at 1194 (arguing that fiduciary duties should
extend to displaced workers).
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the environmental and social impacts of decisions made by corpora-
tions could be within the group of those defined as having corporate
interactions, this group of non-stakeholders actually would be quite
small. This is true even if a corporation's failure to act in some re-
gards—such as failure to give to unrelated charities—could be pre-
served conceptually as an area without an effect. on others. As this ex-
ample suggests, however, the group of those with no other interaction
with a particular corporation nonetheless might have some interest. in
reforming it. or otherwise extracting something from it as a matter of
corporate philanthropy,
Two cutting-edge schools of corporate analysis sometimes are
identified with the progressive movement. The first. is the team pro-
duction approach.° The second is behavioral economics. 61 Roth share
an interest in speaking the language of neoclassical economics; al-
though they divergently realign some of its basic assumptions, they
derive similar, "progressive" conclusions."
Team production scholars contend that the board of directors
should be understood as an independent "mediating hierarchy" vis-a-vis
the various constituents of a corporation. In their view, the constitu-
ents are those with team specific inputs. 63 The board should be
charged with employing the inputs of financiers, workers, communi-
ties, and other constituents to maximize the value of the firm, and
with allocating resulting profits fairly among the inputting groups."
In this model, the interests of shareholders are not to be preferred,
except in somewhat minor, process-based ways attributable to historic
happenstance and/or continuing convenience, such as the ability to
elect directors and to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corpo-
ration.° The long-standing acceptance of corporate philanthropy is
taken as some evidence of the model's viability 66
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 249 (1999). Note, however, that the adherents of this model specifically dis-
avow identification as progressives. Id. at 253-54.
41 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of
Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 581, 583 (2002); Christine ions et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998).
62 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
63 Blair & Stout, supra note 60, at 250.
64 Id. at 250-51.
it Id. at 313-15.
Sec Margaret M. Blair, A Contraetarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 STE'rsort L.
Rt:v. 27, 33 (1998) (defending director's contributions to corporate charities through the
team production model).
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The second recently popularized approach to corporate law, be-
havioral economics, involves utilization of empirical studies of human
behavior in order to reassess and revamp some of the assumptions of
neoclassical economic analysis. 67 For purposes of this Article, some of
the most important insights of this method have to do with the role of
altruism in economic behavior. Numerous studies document that, in
many situations, human beings act in a manner that is moderately al-
truistic rather than classically self-interested. 68 This means that the
outcomes hypothetically bargained for by those involved in the behav-
ioral economist's corporate nexus of contracts could be quite differ-
ent from those hypothetically achieved as a matter of neoclassical
economic analysis. Notably, shareholders might prefer, and thus con-
cede, that directors should have discretion to compromise the strict
financial interests of the shareholders in some circumstances.69
4. The Outsiders
The term "outsider" potentially encompasses the large number of
women, minorities, economically disadvantaged individuals, and oth-
ers who have been outside traditional power structures, including the
tipper echelons of both political and corporate hierarchies. Outsiders
often are skeptical of the analyses and actual laws produced by the
traditionally empowered. 7°
Outsider skepticism can and does extend both to established
doctrines and to ostensible progressive reforms that are board-cen-
tered—that is, based on directorial power and discretion. 71 Corporate
law and corporate culture tend to concentrate power over the many
87 Greenfield, supra note 61, at 588 (indicating that behavioral law and economics "in-
sights may prove to weaken conventional corporate law theory sufficiently so that much of
it will have to be reconsidered and replaced"); see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring.-
The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 Comm. Bus. L. REF'. 71, 73;
Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal spirits of the Stock Alathets: A Behavioral Approach to
Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 137 (2002). Although it is the author's belief
that at least some of these studies could be interpreted as easily as evidence of the subjects'
preference for gambling as for altruism, that is not the subject of this Article.
68 Greenfield, supra note 61, at 628.
69 CI id. at 633-40 (discussing significance of behavioral incentives to share and coop-
erate for the conduct of directors, without addressing shareholder preference).
' a See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-79
(1986); Jeffrey J. Pyle, Note, Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack on
the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C. L. REV. 787, 797 (1999).
71 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Alan's Burden, 70 Gpo.
WAsti. L. REV. 944, 952 (2002).
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in the hands of the few." Proposals for corporate overhaul tend to
further concentrate this power in the hands of those who already have
it and arguably have misused it." Thus, progressive—including team
production—appeals to a board that has the discretion and/or duty
to consider non-shareholder interests still are appeals to (predomi-
nantly) privileged, middle-aged white males." This is the group that,
even before the advent of neoclassical shareholder pritnacy," gave us
sweatshops, as well as laws and policies excluding women and minori-
ties from the workforce and otherwise limiting their opportunities."
Even with the (arguably) best of reformed intentions, it is extremely
unlikely that such a group can, of its own accord, perceive the issues
of concern to the disadvantaged, much less respond to them.
Token representations of women, minorities, workers, and others
on boards are, in a sense, incursions by outsiders:77 These representa-
tions are, however, unlikely to result in meaningful reform. The token
representatives elected to boards, unless responsible in some legal or
emotional way to those they ostensibly represent, are likely to as-
sume—indeed, are likely already to have assumed—the attitudes of
72 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 8 (2002) (describing the board of directors as "[p]latonic guardian [5]," those wise
few who make decisions in the best interest of the community); Brett W. King, The Use of
Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and minority
Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL, J. CORP. L. 895, 923 (1996) (citing the shift to majority voting
rules as the reason for the transfer of power to boards of directors).
7:1
	 e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 129-34, 157-61
(2001) (calling for lengthening the term of board members and lengthening the time
between mandated disclosure of financial reports as methods of alleviating pressure on
boards to focus on short-term results).
7-1 A 2001 Canadian survey found that only 9.8% of board seats in Canada, and only
12.4% of Fortune 500 board seats in the United States, were held by women. Janis Sarra,
The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEArrit: J. Soc. JusT. 457, 487
(2002); sec FED. GLASS CEILING COMM'N, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAK-
ING FULL USE OF 'TIIE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL, 9 (1995), available at http://www.dol.
gov/asp/programs/history/reich/reports/ceiling.pdf (stating that only 0.60% of senior
level managers in major companies were African-American when the report was pub-
lished).
75 See sources cited supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
See generally Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 952-53 (describing feminist and other reac-
tions to director-centered proposals).
77 See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Direc-
tors, 76 Tut.. L. REV. 1363, 1385-87 (2002) (relating increased representation of women,
minorities, and non-nationals on corporate boards to new managerial attitudes); Steven A.
Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. IL, Bus. & FIN. 85, 90 (2000) (citing demo-
graphics and globalization as creating a huSiness need for diversity among boards).
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the majority board members. 78 Their presence on the board thus may
be a placebo interfering with more meaningful change.
Given the dominance of the board of directors both in tradi-
tional structure and reform proposals, there are two obvious ways for
outsiders to react. One reaction is that they must do the best they can
with what they have, perhaps resigning themselves to the notion that
if capital is to agglomerate, it must be managed centrally This is, in
effect, a "necessary evil" view of board-based structures, calling, how-
ever, for intense and continuing scrutiny of board composition and
function. The other reaction is to begin to color outside the lines.
This approach calls for rethinking—if not changing—some of the ba-
sic assumptions of corporate law and may call on the tools of "exter-
nal" law to make necessary adjustments.
B. The Internal/External Dichotomy
The traditional distinction between internal corporate law and
law external to the corporation is by no means mysterious to those
inclined to accept it. The "internal affairs" doctrine is an excellent
starting place and, indeed, the most consequential aspect of the dis-
tinction. It is a well-established tenet of conflicts law that the laws of a
corporation's state of incorporation govern its "internal affairs." 79
These are the laws that govern the relationships between the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, officers, and directors. 80 They do not en-
compass the laws addressing the relationships between the corpora-
tion and its non-officer agents, including its non-officer employees,
presumably because these relationships are thought to be no different
than those of individuals and their employees or other agents. In a
sense, the original notion of "internal" corporate law relied on tradi-
tionalist imagery in addressing the matters necessary to animate the
inhuman corporate creature. 81
The contents of a corporations casebook may confuse this issue
slightly, beginning, as they often do, with coverage of agency and part-
78 For discussion of the co-option process, see, for example, John M. Darley, How Or-
ganizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing; in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH INTO BUSINESS Elittcs 13 (David M. Messick Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
8° It is thought by some that the Internal affairs" doctrine also encompasses the doc-
trine of limited liability as a question of the "relationship of shareholders to their corpora-
tion." ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED Li.
ABILITY COMPANIES 334 (7th ed. 2001).
81 See sources cited supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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net-ship law, and including some scattered coverage of federal securities
laws.82 Both are practically useful to those contemplating practice in the
business world, and the former is helpful in understanding both the
derivation and operation of many "internal" corporate law doctrines.
The latter may be understood as regulating the formation of the rela-
tionship between shareholders and the corporation and has reflected
an established, albeit hesitant, federal intrusion ones and uneasy inter-
action with, 84 state laws governing corporate internal affairs. As will be
expanded upon below, recent events have overcome some, but far from
all, of this established federal hesitance and unease. 85
To non-traditionalists, the internal/external line would seem to
be more puzzling, or, at any rate, less natural. Neoclassical econo-
mists, however, find value in permitting states to signal the "package"
of bargains they offer, something that would not be possible without
the "internal affairs" doctrine and thus some notion of what "internal
affairs" are. 88 Neoclassical economists and progressives alike might
concede that the internal/external line has descriptive power and is
largely a question of acknowledging who has enforcement power. If it
is the shareholders vis-a-vis the corporation, its officers, or its direc-
tors, it is corporate law. If it is creditors or employees, it is something
82 sc.
r e.g., DTILLIANI A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS,
AND CORPORATIONS 1-203, 390-490 (4th ed. 2000) (dealing with agency and partnerships
in chapters 1 and 2, and briefly discussing securities and disclosure laws in chapter 4, sec-
tions 3 and 4).
83 Proxy rules governing communications in the course of shareholder vote-taking, in-
cluding the election of directors, are a prime example. Section 14(a) of the '34 Act gov-
erns the solicitation of proxies in connection with shareholders' meetings, at which the
business conducted is a matter of state law. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (2004).
86 For cases illustrating the conflict between federal tender offer legislation and state
takeover statutes, see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 74 (1987); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626 (1982); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Food Corp„
877 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1989) and see also Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and
Stale Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495,
503-05 (2003) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's attempts at reconciling federal securi-
ties laws with notions of internal corporate governance).
85 See infra notes 199-152 and accompanying text.
88 See Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bailout" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Develop-
meats in Delawares corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rix. 913, 913-14 (1982) (arguing against
a federal corporate law scheme to replace the various state schemes); Marcel Kahan &
Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. Rr.v. 679, 682
(2002) (stating that "fwlith market capitalization of public corporations in the United
States in the range of $16 trillion, the dynamics that shape the laws states offer to govern
the internal affairs of companies are of .substantial importance").
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else, but is still a matter of private law. If it. is the state, it is public law,
and something else yet again. 87
This said, it is worth emphasizing that critical to the progressive
corporate law movement is the notion that non-shareholders should
be regarded as within the corporate tent and presumably given some
interest in enforcement. 88 Thus, to progressives, the descriptive line
separating shareholder-enforceable matters from other issues seems
arbitrary. Why, outside of traditional imagery and political power, are
shareholders any more crucial to corporate operation than consum-
ers or employees?89 It also is worth emphasizing that to the extent
shareholder privilege (including shareholder enforcement of duties
owed by the board of directors) is central to "internal" corporate law,
outsiders are apt to be extremely unimpressed with the inter-
nal/external distinction.
In summary, apart from the choice-of-law consequences of identi-
fying an issue or relationship as "internal" to the affairs of the corpo-
ration, the only reality that appears to inhere in the internal/external
dichotomy involves recognition of stakeholder status, or lack thereof.
If one is recognized by economists, progressives, and/or policymakers
as a stakeholder with respect to corporate governance, one's interests
are more apt to be considered when issues labeled "corporate govern-
ance" arise and one is more apt to be assigned some sort of remedy.
This presents outsiders with a choice of strategies—seeking recogni-
tion as stakeholders or seeking to minimize the overall importance of
corporate law.
C. The Continuum
Somewhat related to consideration of the internal/external dis-
tinction is contemplation of a continuum of possible values to be fur-
87 See Greenfield, supra note 61, at 591. Note, however, that the usual ability of a state
to bring quo warranto proceedings has the theoretical effect of blurring these distinctions.
Sec id. at 591-601 (describing corporate law as public law).
88 Millon, supra note 45, at 13 (stating that "[dile multifiduciary label conveniently
captures the idea that nonshareholders as well as shareholders ought to be the
beneficiaries of managerial decisionmaking"); Mitchell, supra note 59, at 1168-70 (arguing
that fiduciary rights should be extended to corporate bondholders): O'Connor, supra note
57, at 1194 (arguing that fiduciary duties should be extended to displaced workers).
89 Giving outside regulators such authority is something different. Although outside
regulation is not a particular focus of progressives, it is conceded even by neoclassical eco-
nomic analysis to be appropriate in those circumstances in which public policy dictates an
outcome not covered by the bargains of those with recognized stakes in the corporation
and its activities. Sec sources cited sum note 45 and accompanying text.
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thered by the existing structure and possible reforms of corporate law.
At one end of the continuum is the financial well-being of the corpora-
tion as manifested in shareholder wealth; at the other end is genuine
corporate philanthropy—that is, philanthropy undertaken for reasons
not related to buying public will for purposes of generating profit. Oc-
cupying the middle ground is some area of social conscience, defined
in terms of potential for corporate impact from business more or less
in the ordinary course. If we were conceptualizing this continuum in
terms of human values or motivations, we might be tempted to express
it through an image of concentric rings—self-interest of a certain type
at the core (again, manifest in shareholder wealth), rippling out to a
consideration of the interests of others immediately impacted, eventu-
ally extending to recognition of the interests of those with no obvious
relation to the corporation. These conceptualizations can assist in
identifying the focus of particular analysts/schools of thought, as well
as in discussing proposed legal reforms and the possibility of extend-
ing their effects. Their very enunciation, however, tends to reveal the
extent to which shareholder interests are taken as a starting point in
corporate law and how critically th is assumption shapes our thinking.
H. SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION
A. What Did We Know and When. Did We Know It?
There are two stories to be told about the Enron/WorldCom-type
debacles." The first story is about what happened inside these com-
panies, which has been the subject of a flood of news articles, con-
gressional investigations, and regulatory reactions. 91 The second has
to do with what happened to the price of Enron and WorldCom's
stock." Confusion over the two stories in the public mind has con-
tributed greatly to what appears to be a change in focus from broader
90 Although there are, of course, subsequent examples, Enron and WorldCom got the
ball rolling and will be used as the primary examples for purposes of this discussion.
91 See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., bir011's Many Strands: The Directors; Harsh Words from
Senators to the Board, N.Y. Tnkt Ls, May 8, 2002, at C7 (following the Enron scandal as part of
a continuous series of articles); Simon Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Overview; World-
Com Facing Charges of Fraud; Inquiries Expand, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at Al (following
the WorldCom debacle as part of a continuing series of articles).
92 See William W. Bratton, Enron arid the Dar* Side of Shareholder Wile, 76 Tut.. L. REV.
1275, 1276-77 (2002) (noting that Enron's share price at its peak in 2000 was around
$90.00 per share and at the time of its bankruptcy had dropped to $0.60 per share); Ro-
mero, supra note 91, at Al (noting that the NASDAQ suspended trading of WorldCom
.shares after its announcement that it would file for bankruptcy).
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issues of corporate responsibility to an obsessive preoccupation with
the integrity of corporate management and financial statements.
As indicated above, others have gone to great lengths to docu-
ment the "inside story" of the Enron and WorldCom disasters. 93 Suc-
cinctly put, in each case, corporate managers engaged in behavior
that resulted in a deceptive portrayal of the corporation's financial
state. The behavior presumably was motivated by the actors' belief
that this portrayal would positively affect the market worth of the cor-
poration in question, as well as the actors' own financial positions. For
a substantial period of time, the behavior was either unknown to or
misunderstood by regulators and perhaps some members of the
board of directors. The behavior eventually was detected and discon-
tinued. End of story.
The narrative of what happened to Enron and WorldCom stock
prices is linked to the "inside story," but the link is only a partial one.
During the go-go financial markets at the turn of the century, both
stocks were high flyers." Of course, so were the stocks of many other
companies, including many that were reporting honestly a complete
lack of profitability.95 Traditional formulae relating stock price to
company earnings per share simply were not relevant.% Stock pur-
chasers, with the exception of rank-and-file company employees97 ac-
quiring stock through company stock purchase plans, frequently had
no intention of holding their shares long enough for the company to
realize any earnings. 98 Instead, they often were gambling on being
93 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 92, at 1276-81; David Milton, Why Is Corporate Manage-
ment Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 890, 893-97 (2002).
9i For a timeline illustrating Enron's dramatic stock plummet for 2001, see Bratton,
supra note 92, at 1276-77, 1318-19.
95 See David W. Tice, Big Bear Says, "The Market Is Out of Control": Just Because Stocks Am
Soaring Doesn't Mean They Aren't Tremendously Overvalued ON ‘VALL STREET, May 1, 1998,
1998 WL 11649455; David W. Tice, Remember the Bottom Line: What's Going to Happen When
Investors Again Demand Profits?, ON WALL. STREET, Dec. 1, 2000, 2000 WL 8695162.
96 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 228 (2001); Ron Chernow,
Hard.Chaiging Bulls and Red Flags, N.Y. Timis, Sept. 2, 1998, at A31; Jack Willoughby, Gravy
Train: Everybody Wants to Be on Board the Express to IPO Riches, BARRON'S, Dec. 13, 1999, at
37.
97 Corporate employees thus compose a group of inevitable bag-holders who have re-
ceived relatively little regulatory recognition post-Enron. See sources cited supra notes 13-25;
infra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
98 Day traders are, of course, the quintessential example of shareholders with short-term
interests, See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Master of a New Universe, WAsil. PosT, May 16, 1999
(Magazine), at W8 (describing the life of a young day trader).
2004]	 Corporate Responsibility 	 845
able to sell to someone making the same bet at a higher price.gg This
meant that market players had little incentive to investigate account-
ing practices or to be particularly concerned about the quality of
earnings before they purchased, and no time or opportunity to inves-
tigate or manifest concern before they sold. Traditional gatekeepers
such as investment bankers and accounting firms no doubt under-
stood and responded to this lack of incentive."° Less sophisticated
investors, who might have subscribed to more of a buy-and-hold phi-
losophy once lured into the market by its "New Economy" hype and
"can't lose" atmosphere," quite possibly lacked the skills, as well as
the time, to detect irregularities.
Of course, when the market deflated, stock prices settled back
down, but still lacked a traditional price-to-earnings correlation. 102 At
this stage, however, the aura of profitability at. Enron and WorldCom
presumably prevented their stock prices from settling as far and as fast
as might otherwise have transpired. It may well be the case that this
was a period in which some of the most dubious internal decisions
were made, or when attempts at concealment intensified. It became
increasingly clear, however, that, the music would stop and that those
left standing would have incentives to start looking for someone to
blame. This realization provided at least some of the insiders at the
affected companies with a reason to disclose the companies' true
financial positions. Disclosure led to a precipitous decline in the price
of the securities issued by these companies, as well as to declines in
market-wide securities prices.
When the financial shenanigans at major companies were
closed, people realized that they had been playing in a crooked ca-
' See Gabaldon, supra note 96, at 233 (characterizing this practice as "crowd predic-
tion").
100 For discussion of regulatory reaction to the failures of traditional gatekeepers, see,
for example, Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Gov-
ernance?, 48 Vim- L. Rev. 1189, 1189-92 (2003).
101 For an excellent description of the interaction of media and market price, see
ROBERT SCHILLER, IRRATIONAL. EXUBERANCE 152 (2000).
102 See generally Tharan L. Cook et al., Murphy's Law? An Examination of the Growth Flow
Valuation Method for Technology Stocks, 5 .1. WEALTH Mnwr., Mar. 22, 2003, at 50, 50 (describ-
ing alternative valuation method in light of traditional ratio's inability to explain pricing);
Dave Flessner Jamee Smith, Meltdown Creates Investor Angst, CHATTANomA Tints FREE
PRESS, July 16, 2002, at Cl (describing then-current stockholder despair), LEXIS, News
Library; Stephen Foley, The Investment Column: l'odafonc Offers a Bumpy Ride to Wealth, THE
INDEPENDEN'E (London). Aug. 21, 2001, at 15 (predicting return to traditional pricing),
LEXIS, News Library; Alan Goldstein, "Clever" Isn't Cool Anymore, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 3, 2002, at ID (same), LEXIS, News Library.
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sino—that the odds offered on the Enron and WorldCom games were
represented unfairly. The logic of this realization extended into suspi-
cion of other games in the same casino, thus contributing to an over-
all diminution in market levels. The announcement of the first dis-
honest game, Enron, had a dramatic impact that was amplified by
subsequent announcements with respect to other companies.m
The casino analogy is an imperfect one, however, because rela-
tively few people may have been betting on the outcome of corporate
profitability. Instead, they often were betting on what other people
would bet on what other people would bet, ad infinitum. As indicated
above, the Enron and WorldCom disclosures reminded investors that
someday the music would stop, and that simple reminder was all that
was necessary to actually stop the music for those companies. Inves-
tors then realized that what had happened to Enron and WorldCom
stocks could happen to other stocks. Soon, as the stock price of the
company founded by Martha Stewart. demonstrates, any intimation
that prospective investors might balk at buying stock tomorrow pro-
vided a reason for current investors to sell today. 10"
Seen this way, John Maynard Keynes's famous example of betting
on the outcome of a beauty pageant is most apt. 135 Unlike a horse
race, where one bets on which horse has a particular attribute
(speed), beauty contest bettors wager not on which contestant has the
desired characteristic (beauty), but on how the judges will assess that
characteristic)° Similarly, in the stock market, it recently has not
been important to know which companies actually will be profitable,
but only which companies will be judged investment-worthy. There-
fore, it is important to know something about the judges and their
criteria. If it is believed that the judges care whether the contestants'
physical attributes are real, and it then becomes apparent that the at-
tributes of one contestant (Enron) are surgically enhanced and the
attributes of another contestant (WorldCom) simply are false, then
the odds for those contestants change, Moreover, speculators may be-
105 See Michael Goldsmith, Resurrecting RICO: Removing Immunity for White-Collar Crime,
41 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 282 (2004).
t04 See Philip F.S. Berg, Note, Unfit to Serve: Permanently Barring People front Serving as Of-
ficers and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VANI). L. REV.
1871, 1872 (2003). Thus, in the months following the first indication that Martha Stewart
might be indicted for insider trading, the stock of her eponymous company declined sig-
nificantly. Sec id.
1°5 JoiiN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYME.NT, INTEREST & MONEY 154-
56 (1936).
106 See id.
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gin to suspect that the practice of augmentation is widespread. Unless
it is shown that it is not, or the judges demonstrate that they are indif-
ferent to the real versus illusion issue, betting enthusiasm will be
dampened. Contestants willing to bare all may tend to be favored.
To extend the no doubt tasteless and definitely sexist beauty con-
test analogy just a bit further, think for a moment about the role of
intelligence and personality. Let's face it, no matter the tout of a par-
ticular pageant, these simply are not what beauty contests are about.
Similar)); the generosity and public-mindedness of corporations have
never been particularly important in market assessments of their
worth. 107 Presumably, this is because, based on long-term history, we
do not believe that the judges (other investors) will ever value these
attributes significantly.
Of course, an excellent personality never actually hurts a beauty
contestant, and in recent years there has been an increased attempt. to
showcase and value this attribute." Somewhat similarly, in the flush
times of the late 1990s, there were increasing attempts to pay lip serv-
ice to the subject of corporate conscience." After all, as long as a
corporation's other attributes ostensibly were in place, demonstrating
a kindness of spirit did not hurt. We suddenly have become panicked,
however, at what is inside the swimsuit, and for at least some period of
time, we risk losing all focus on characteristics we believe other judges
will find less basic.
In times when all the corporations looked pretty, then it seemed
possible to do good while doing well. After all, doing well seemed a
given, and academics and others were increasingly interested in explor-
ing this possibility. There was enough interest in the subject to prompt
at least a few studies suggesting that a minor de-emphasis of share-
holder primacy (by, say, adopting more worker-friendly policies) did
not necessarily have an adverse impact on either corporate profitability
in It is true, however, that social responsibility financial funds have increased in popu-
larity. See infra note 173 and accompanying text,
1" See, e.g., Betty Beard, Personalities Primped for Scholarship Pageant, Asia. REruutic,
Apr. 4, 2003, Chandler Community Section„ at 1, 2003 WL 17690919: Marshall Carter, 13-
Fear-Old Welcomes Invitation to Pageant, SEBASTIAN SUN (Sebastian, Fla.), June 6, 2003, at Al,
http://web.tcpalm.com/sitetools/archives.h mil.
105 For example, the percentage of "green" (environmentally friendly) new products in
the United States increased from 4.5% in 1989, to 11.4% in 1990, and to 13.4% in 1991.
Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New Corporate Social Responsibility,
62 U. Port .. L. REV. 605, 644-45 (2001).
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or market value."° It does not appear, however, that corporate respon-
sibility ever became a serious factor in market valuation. In other words,
it never became something that most investors sought either to invest
in or gamble about. This may reflect the attitude that we do not believe
our fellow investors are sufficiently high-minded to value corporate
character. It is possible, however, to gamble about many things that
people do not personally value or actually seek to possess themselves
(pork bellies come quickly to mind). From this standpoint, it may be
that there simply are not enough established rules about the develop-
ment or deterioration of corporate conscience to make betting on it
(or other people's assessment of it) an interesting game.
As we find ourselves in a time when the quality of earnings re-
ports has captured our attention, and we contemplate ways in which
integrity can be assured and/or credibly signaled to markets, it may
be useful to raise our eyes a bit, and think about whether some of the
same tools we propose to enhance integrity can be employed for
other matters of conscience. Recent events suggest that market judges
(investors) do place value on truthfulness, and attempts are being
made to enhance this virtue. Why not consider meaningful ways in
which other virtues may be encouraged, demonstrated, and valued?"'
B. Common Cause, Common Remedy?
Presumably; the primary reason relatively short-term investors care
about corporate truth-telling is that they believe that when the true
state of financial affairs is revealed someone (perhaps themselves) will be
placed at risk of loss. This analysis has little relation to concern for cor-
porate conscience. Nonetheless, the lack of corporate truth-telling and
the lack of these other virtues may have a common progenitor. Accord-
ingly, it is useful to discuss this progenitor and to think about whether
diminishing its stature and effect may have common benefits.
Lack of corporate integrity arguably and plausibly stems from
over-preoccupation with stock price, said to be the modern surrogate
for shareholder primacy." 2 In other words, managers who are sup-
1111 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 60, at 288 (arguing that shareholder primacy is
merely the recognized norm because of voting rights and derivative suit standing).
Cf. mrrcilEll., supra note 73, at 115 (stating that you manage what you measure.
Even if the structure and rules of corporate law weren't such as to keep managements'
eyes focused on the daily stock quotations, the simple fact is that the other set of perform-
ance measures available to them are the corporations' financial statements.").
112 See id. (linking stock price maximization to numerous examples of unethical corpo-
rate behavior).
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posed to be putting shareholder interests first do so by increasing the
market value of the shares of the corporation. 115 Short-term versus
long-term market value is a distinction that tends to be lost in the
shuffle for at least two reasons. The first, and most obvious, reason is
the competition offered by short-term profit maximizing strategies
engaged in by other companies, particularly during euphoric market
periods. 114 The second reason is the self-interest of managers in main-
taining jobs and reaping the benefits of stock options that can be ex-
ercised profitably in the short term if stock prices rise quickly." 5 The
existence of option-based compensation programs is justified primar-
ily as a method of aligning management interests with the interests of
shareholders, thereby protecting shareholder primacy. 116 The method
of alignment is based on a common interest in steadily increasing
stock prices.
Shareholder primacy has been the focus of a great deal of recent
debate about corporate social responsibility.'" It is said to be a linch-
pin of traditional and neoclassical economic corporate analysis. 1 " It is
also a primary point of attack for those progressive corporate law
scholars who wish to expand the realm of corporate stakeholders. 119 It
seems obvious, then, to start thinking about corporate integrity, re-
113 SeeMillon, supra note 93, at 890.
"4 See Bratton, supra note 92, at 1328-32 (pointing out that Enron's obsession with its
stock price may have been a result of its competitive culture and the desire to "win" corpo-
rate profits).
15 See id. at 1328. Stock options usually are tied to long-term success, but Enron's
management bonus structure was such that it awarded managers based on the perform-
ance of the company's stock compared to the market as a whole, as well as their ability to
meet various periodic performance criteria. Id.
" 6 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin .), Murphy, CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HAuv. Bus. REv., May–June 1990, at 138, 138 (positing that the problem with
executive pay at the beginning of the 1990s was that it had no link to corporate perform-
ance). But see Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions ExecutiveCompensation in the Era of Pay for
Performance, 75 Norton: DAmE L. REv. 271, 273-74 (1999) (stating that "while CEOs and
their compensation consultants often use the rhetoric of pay for performance to justify
higher amounts of compensation, they also may seek to reduce the risk attached by in-
creasing the number of options granted, setting easy performance goals, or repricing un-
derwater options").
117 For a summary analysis of the ongoing debate, see, for example, 0. Gordon Smith,
The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 231 CORP. L. 277, 277, 280 (1998); Stout, supra note 53, at
1189-90.
115 See EASTERBROOK & FiscnEt., supra note 49, at 36.
110 See, e.g., Ronald M. Green, Shatrholdets as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate
Governance, 50 WAstt. & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1411-12 (1993); Lawrence E. klitchell, Coopera-
tion and Constraint in the Modern Cotpotyrtion: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality,
73 TEx. L. REv. 477, 479-81 (1995).
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sponsibility, and philanthropy by asking a few pointed questions about
shareholder primacy. The most basic is whether publicly held corpo-
rations need shareholders at al1. 126
Various roles might be—and from time to time have been—ascribed
to shareholders. They might be seen as the repository of ultimate gov-
erning authority, owing to their ability to elect the board of directors,
and/or to sell their shares to someone else who is interested in doing
so. 121 Although corporate managers traditionally have not owed fiduciary
duties to the shareholders, but rather to the corporate entity, 122 share-
holders have been granted enforcement authority in the ability to bring
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation. 123 They might
then be viewed as the group ultimately to blame for corporate defalca-
dons.
As a practical matter, these roles may be disposed of rather
quickly, leaving only one role (discussed below) for more serious
contemplation. First, shareholders of public corporations are noto-
rious for electing the slate of directors that management suggests. 124
Second, there is recent empirical evidence that shareholders of pub-
lic corporations, who vote with their feet by selling in large numbers
to someone who wishes to install new (presumably superior) man-
agement, are not disposing of systematically mismanaged firms. 126
Third, the ability to bring derivative causes of action has been so se-
verely restricted, 126 and the liability of officers and directors so lim-
I20 See generally Theresa A. GabaHon, Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Publicly Held Corpo-
rations and Their Shareholders (Aug. 15, 2004) (unpublished manuscript under submis-
sion and on file with the author). This is a different question from whether privately held
corporations need shareholders. See id. at 35-36.
121 See Blair & Stout, supra note 60, at 248; Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federal-
ism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAw & CON-
TEMN. PROBS. 215, 216-18 (1999).
122 Sec RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a (1958) (stating that a board of
director's "duties are owed to the corporation itself rather than to the shareholders indi-
vidually or collectively"). The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that the board of direc-
tors owes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and the shareholders. See,
e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).
125 Blair & Stout, supra note 60, at 292-97.
124 Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American
Corporations, 46 Am. J. Coml.. L. 317, 325-26 (1998) (suggesting that management's control
over corporate information and proxy solicitation at the corporation's expense allows it to
influence a shareholder's voting decision).
125 See Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from
Operating and Stock Rctu MS, 381. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANAL. 721, 721-22 (2003).
126 See James Cotton, Another Nail in the Coffin of the Small Investor: The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,17 TOURO L. REV. 733, 738 (2001) (citing the Private Securities
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ited, 127 as to render the right trivial, and quite frequently called into
play by self-interested attorneys who are relative strangers to the
corporation. 128 When shareholders of a publicly held corporation
take an active interest in corporate business, it is newsworthy, and
almost exclusively a phenomenon of involvement by institutional
investors. 128 We neither expect nor facilitate involvement by individ-
ual investors.
Another more descriptively accurate role has been assigned to
the shareholders of public corporations. Shareholders have been de-
scribed as the "residual claimants" vis-a-vis the corporation. 13° Thus,
when profits increase, the shareholders benefit from this bounty; if
profits decline, shareholders feel the loss.' The role, then, amounts
to the acceptance of the risk of corporate loss in exchange for the
possibility of theoretically unlimited gain.
Of course, given the existence of limited liability, shareholders
cannot feel the loss of anything beyond their initial capital input.'"
This is exactly the same kind of risk that a creditor assumes; the only
distinction is the extent of the risk. Risk differentials are typically
dealt with by adjusting rates of return.'" In other words, insofar as
risk-bearing is concerned, relatively highly compensated creditors
would do just as well as shareholders, at least if the maturity of the
debt. were sufficiently long term.
Litigation Reform Act, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I I, and various state statutes as
limiting small investors' ability to bring a derivative action),
127 See Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in Corporate Law: Perfecting the Exonera-
tion of Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and Straining the Framework of Corporate Law, 1998
CoLum. Bus. L. REV. 443, 469.
128 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Fire Riders and Me Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects of Share-
holder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General Applicability,
73 MINN. L. REv. 425, 425-26 (1988) (highlighting the ethical problems that arise by law-
yer solicitations of various corporate derivative suits).
129 Cf. Bernard Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, irr
3 Tin: NEW PAI,GRAVE DICTIONARY or ECONOMICS AND 'HIE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed•
1998) (describing phenomenon in institutional investor activism and its lack of effect).
130 Blair & Stout, supra note 60, at 263.
" I See id. at 262-63.
1112 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CIII. L. REY. 89, 89-90 (1985); Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership,
37 EMORY L.J. 835, 841 (1988).
133 According to Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, the Coase theorem dem-
onstrates that the risk of a particular investment always is reflected in its price. Supra note
132, at 97 11.13; see also Ronald H. Coase, .77te Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Ec.or r. 1, 2-6
(1960) (explaining theorem and relationship between risk and price).
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Must shareholders receive the prospect of unlimited returns to
induce them to accept the limited risk of loss of their capital? Of course
not. What shareholders require is some signaled assurance that their
capital eventually will be repaid along with an adequate return to make
forgoing alternative investments worthwhile. The traditional role of
shareholders of public corporations, then, with respect to risk-bearing,
is to permit some amount of capital raising in which the terms of re-
payment and return are relatively unspecified. This may be convenient
for the corporation, but it surely is not necessary for sophisticated capi-
tal providers, who will have a good idea of exactly how these terms
might be calculated. 134 Its convenience for the corporation may even be
subject to question, given the fact that the corporate debt market is the
source of much more capital than the stock market.' 35
Ironically, although it is not necessary for shareholders to be re-
sidual risk bearers (and in fact they are not truly residual risk bearers,
given limited liability), they are necessary to absorb a corporation's
excess profits. Were a motive to benefit shareholders not present,
corporations presumably would be managed primarily for the pur-
pose of creating goods and providing services, creating jobs and the
like—unless they were managed for the benefit of managers. Provid-
ing shareholders with the right to elect the board and to police man-
agement activity through derivative litigation is a method of symboli-
cally diverting management from its own interest, but there could be
other methods of allocating and rewarding the exercise of these rights
without coupling them with the right to residual profits.
One can imagine a structure in which an independent board
concerned itself directly with creating goods, jobs, and the like, re-
garding profitability in excess of costs as doing no more than creating
a desirable cushion to assure satisfaction of all legitimate claimants
and, perhaps, as a carefully employed tool to motivate management.
The cold truth, however, is that to the extent this imagining seems to
call for all corporations to be non-profit organizations or to be gov-
ernment run, it coextensively occupies the realm of fantasy. The
American political mystique is wedded firmly to America's view of it-
134 It does, however, permit unsophisticated capital providers to take respectable gambles.
135 See, e.g., Canadian Oil Industry Financings Hit 10-Fear High, OIL & GAS J., Mar. 10,
2003, at 38, 38 (debt comprising $9.98 billion (Canadian) total oil financing in 2002),
LEXIS, News Library; Australia Q3 Current a/c Deficit 7.871 bin and vs 7.305 Q2; Consensus
7.6, AFX Eve. Focus, Nov. 29, 2002 (describing $57 billion of equity as opposed $347 bil-
lion of debt), LEXIS, News Library.
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self as a capitalist nation."° The primary, continuing role of the pub-
lic shareholder may be to symbolize our commitment to that view,
Thus, the foregoing observations should not be understood to
call for a transition to some variant of government ownership. Rather,
they are meant to indicate that the role of a shareholder is a construct.
in the case of publicly held corporations, and it is a continuing con-
struct because although economists have separated entrepreneurs
and shareholders,"7 public imagery confuses them. We believe that
shareholders are necessary for progress to continue, and because we
believe this we will not give them up. This does not mean that public
shareholders are bad for corporate and social well-being (although
they may be), or must be abolished (although perhaps they should
be), or even that they must be better understood (although that.
might be nice). What it does mean is that shareholder primacy is mis-
conceived. Shareholders simply are not more important to the public
corporation, as a practical matter, than creditors, employees, or, for
that. matter, consumers. Profits to be generated for shareholders at
the expense of any of these other groups (that is, profits in excess of a
reasonable return) are not, in this view, theoretically justified. 138
Still, the sacred cows of shareholder primacy and stock price
maximization have given and continue to give a structure to both
corporate law and financial markets that could not be replaced easily.
Developing new mission statements and new cultures for boards of
directors might take years. Reassigning the ability to elect boards and
to bring derivative causes of action would require significant retooling
05 See gmerally CAPITALIST Prom tARCIIV AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 1
Eisenstein ed., 1979) (describing and criticizing the capitalist mystique); MARILYN WAR-
ING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS 1 (1988) (S:11110.
137 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pm. ECON.
288, 289 (1980) (laying to rest the "attractive concept of the entrepreneur" and distin-
guishing the separate functions of management and risk-bearing).
138 With respect to the nonessential nature of public shareholders, the public after-
markets for equity are equally nonessential. They are, however, traditional repositories for
otherwise unused funds, and it would be far too disruptive to abolish them. (Imagine,
among other things, what would happen to the price of real estate.) There is, however, no
reason related to corporate operations to believe that stock prices that are ungrounded in
some sort of reasonable relationship to corporate earnings, or a projection thereof, are a
good thing. Once that reasonable relationship is lost, the aftermarket in a particular cor-
poration's stock becomes no more and no less than a casino in which traders are betting
on investor psychology and precisely when the game of musical chairs will stop. Measures
tailored to affect corporate operations but that also affect this casino atmosphere could be
a good thing, were they to prompt movement back to more long-term holding patterns
resembling something akin to traditional "ownership." See generally Gahaldon, supra note
96, at 229 (discussing regulation of gambling as an analogy for investment regulation).
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of infrastructure. Mitigating market disruptions during any period of
transition would be so difficult (and, in a time of generally downward
volatility, so daunting) as to be nearly dispositive.
Tampering with sacred cows without slaughtering them (that is,
tinkering at the margins) is quite another matter. From this perspective,
a proposal that profits in excess of a reasonable return should be for-
feited to the public good would be too extreme; a contention that they
should be up for grabs might not be. Accordingly; the proposal made
below with respect to tailoring excess profit-based penalties for various
acts of corporate misfeasance or nonfeasance might be palatable.'"
III. THE RECENT INTEGRITY INITIATIVES
Regulatory responses to Enron and others have been well-de-
scribed and debated elsewhere. 10 They are heralded by some as a
necessary correction,"' and regarded by others as an unsettling fed-
eral intrusion into corporations' internal affairs. 142 They have been
described both as the most important development in corporate law
for decadesm and as ultimately trivial.' 44 For purposes of this Article,
the recent regulatory responses are important for several reasons.
First, they indicate political willingness to tinker at the margins of
well-established principles; at the same time, they reveal a cheerful in-
difference to theory. For instance, although some of these responses,
such as those having to do with audit committees,' 45 seem to be based
139 See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes.Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2002); Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their
Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbancs-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior,
116 HAIM L. REV. 2123, 2123 (2003).
141 See The A.A. Sommer:Jr Annual Lecture on Corporate Securities & Financial Law: Post-Enron
America: Au SEC Perspeiotive, 8 FoRnitAst J. CORP. & FIN. L. 335, 342-43 (2003) [hereinafter
SEC Perspective] (including the comments of SEC Commissioner Goldschmid that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act • • . provides the right fundamental framework for our current healing
process").
142 See Ribstein, supra note 140, at 3.
143 SEC Perspective, supra note 141, at 343 (declaring that "[t] his landmark legislation is
the most important securities legislation since the New Deal").
114 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Sarbancs-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director
and Officer Fiduciary Obligations, 76 Sr. jonN's L. REV. 953, 953 (2002) (arguing that Sar-
banes-Oxley merely confirms recent case law interpretations of managers' fiduciary duties);
Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 lions. L. REV. 77, 78 (2003) (arguing that regulatory re-
sponses to large-scale market breakdowns, such those which occurred after the Enron situa-
tion, are unlikely to protect against future occurrences for a number of reasons).
"5 Sec Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A.).
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on the traditionalist "corporation as fictional human" model, others,
such as those focused on auditors and lawyers as gatekeepers of the
public interest,"° do not. The generally manifest concern with prevent-
ing fraud is something virtually all analysts, including most economists,
can endorse, 147 but some specific measures, such as those prohibiting
loans to officers, are more theoretically controversial. 148
Second, the overall emphasis of recent regulatory responses is on
improved disclosure, and thus, is much in keeping with the historic
emphasis of the federal securities laws."9 Nonetheless, these regulatory
responses are touted and perceived as having more to do with monitor-
ing managers than with merely facilitating the transactions pursuant to
which shareholders begin and end their relationships with the entities
in which they invest. The rules prohibiting loans to off cersm and for-
bidding trading during periods that employee/shareholders cannot
trade 151 are obvious examples of this tendency. When added to the ex-
isting federal regime regarding the solicitation of proxies, 152 there
seems to be some critical regulatory mass nudging securities law—or at.
least the perception of securities law—more firmly into the tent of "in-
ternal affairs."
Third, the implications of the new rules for the model of share-
holder primacy are quite interesting. It may be that the shareholder
primacy traditionally manifested hi corporate law is best justified as a
form of protection of long-term investors, while federal securities law
does not discriminate between short- and long-term holders. Still, it is
worth recognizing that when contrasted with broader social concerns,
investor protection is related to, if not identical to, shareholder primacy
cloaked in a federal vernacular. From this standpoint, we may note that
"6 Sec id. §§ 301, 307; see also Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1199-211 (describing new
regulations).
"7 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbroolt & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Pro-
tection of Investors, 70 VA, L. RCN, 669, 673-80 (1984); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY U. 119, 129-31 (1981).
"8 For a discussion of loans to officers and other self-dealing transactions, see Lucian
Arye Bebchuk et al„ Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensa-
tion, 69 U. Cut. L. REv. 751, 831 (2002); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUI, L.
REV, 655, 655-59 (1992): and Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should %t Talk About Fiduciary
Duty Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALls Principles of Corporate Governance,
61 GEO. WAstt. L. REV. 954, 954-55 (1993).
lig See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209, 1227 (1999).
t ° See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402.
151 Sec id. § 306.
l32 See supra note 83.
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in connection with recent reforms, there was a great deal of public
breast-beating over employees who lost their jobs as well as their in-
vestments.'" Moreover, specific rules were adopted on whistle-blower
protection, which was focused clearly on employees,'" and on blackout
periods for insider trading, which were meant to establish parity with
employee/investors.' 55 Most analysts probably would agree, however,
that these turned out to be fairly minor parts of the overall reform
package, and would characterize the overall thrust of the actual regula-
tory reaction as strikingly, if not fanatically, centered on investor protec-
tion and reestablishing confidence in publicly held corporations.'"
Thus, but for incidental concern for employees, matters we might de-
scribe as social responsibility or philanthropy—matters of corporate
conscience—simply were not on the regulatory radar screen.'"
The final significance to this Article of the various regulatory re-
actions to Enron-type debacles lies in the determination of whether
they present any possibilities for addressing broader concerns. Can we
expect reforms predominantly directed toward corporate integrity to
have any fallout in corporate conscience? If there is no such fallout, is
there nonetheless some way to piggyback integrity initiatives in order
to achieve other purposes?
Interestingly, one of the more striking themes of progressive cor-
porate law during the stock market's golden years was corporate
transparency and social accounting. 158 The notion, put simply, is that
requiring disclosure of decisionmakers, decision-making processes,
and consequences in a variety of social impact areas could have pay-
offs in investor interest and corporate behavior. 159 Implicit was the
153 See, e.g., Rick Bragg. Enron's Collapse: Workers; Workers Fed Pain of Layoffs and Added
Sting of Betrayal, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at 1; Theo Francis & Ellen Schultz, Enron Faces
Stilts by 4040 Plan Participants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2001, at Cl; Ellen E. Schultz, Enron
Vilorkers Face Losses on Pensions, Not Just 401(k)s, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 19, 2001, at Cl.
151 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806.
155 Sec id. § 306.
q Mitchell, supra note 100 (analyzing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act without reference to
employee-related provisions).
15 Even though undue managerial concern with stock price was criticized resound-
ingly as contributing to the debacles we witnessed, questioning the importance of share-
holders vis-a-vis corporations evidently was not on the regulatory mind.
156
	 e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance 'Reform" and the New Corporate
Social Responsibility, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2001); David Hess, Social Reporting:
A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 43 (1999); Jay
P. Kesan, Encouraging Firms to Police Themselves: Strategic Prescriptions to Promote Corporate
Self-Auditing, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 165 n.7 (citing Carole Basri, Corporate Transparency:
The Triple BottoM Line Audit, N.Y 14, Sept. 30, 1999, at 5); supra note 149, at 1199.
153 Sec Williams, SUPla note 149, at 1293-96.
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idea that the disclosures would be truthful. This suggests that integrity
initiatives could be helpful in achieving other social goals if those
goals already were the subject of mandatory disclosure. It is this last
piece of the puzzle, however, that thus far remains unaddressed.
Moreover, one might fear that publicized hysteria over corporate bot-
tom lines has pushed it farther out of reach.
IV. INSIDE, OUTSIDE, UPSIDE DOWN, OR EVERY WHICH WAY YOU CAN
The distinction between corporate/entity law and other bodies of
law is a perplexing one. As I have commented elsewhere, 160 develop-
ments in corporate/entity law are at cross-purposes with developments
in other private law areas such as tort and contract. law. This is illus-
trated by the enhancement of investor insulation from liability even as
entity liability for some types of tortious conduct has increased. 161 Al-
though there may be good reasons to permit and/or encourage this
particular distinction, those reasons have not been addressed by public
policymakers. Thus, the coherence of the resulting package—if it ever
is perceived accurately as a single package—is suspect.
Most certainly, the possibility of disconnects and conflicts be-
tween corporate/entity law and various "public" law subjects is just as
troubling. Environmental and labor law provide ready examples of
attempts to regulate primarily, if not exclusively, corporate conduct
for public purposes with no apparent recognition by policymakers
that changes in entity law might also be pressed into service, Aca-
demic debate, however, has begun to catch up in the field of employ-
ment. For example, complementary proposals have been made to en-
hance the interests of workers by securing board representation for
them, by creating a fiduciary duty owed by the board of directors to
workers, 162 and by explicit changes in labor law.I 65
The eye-catching vision of the "corporation as fictional human"
no doubt has much to do with these historic and traditional divides.
Moreover, the public/private distinction may have been preserved, if
not augmented, by the attitudes of the law and economics school to-
ward preserving the primacy of private bargaining.'" It is somewhat
16' Theresa Gahaldon. Experiencing Limited Liability: On Insularity and Inbrreding in Car-
porate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 111-12 (L.-mTence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
161 See id. at 112-15.
162 Greenfield, supra note 61, at 643.
163 M. at 638.
164 See, e.g., Dan iel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,
1273-74 (1982).
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ironic in this day and age to reflect on the origins and original close
tailoring of corporate charters to achieve very public goals.m 5
The analysis that follows will attempt to take account both of the
"corporation as fictional human" and "corporation as private bargain"
views in proposing a method of dealing with matters of corporate
conscience. It will be based on the premise that there is no necessary
border between corporate and other types of law, The solution that
should be adopted is the solution that works, regardless of whether it
disturbs analytic elegance.
A. The Cotporate Jiminy Cricket
As a matter of traditional conceptualization, the fictional being that
is the corporation has a brain, and that brain is the board of directors. 166
When we become concerned with the virtue of the corporation—either
its integrity or its fairness-,-we turn to the board. Thus, if we are con-
cerned with the reliability of financial statements, we see proposals fo-
cusing on board audit cornmittees.m If we are concerned with whether
workers get a fair shake, we may generate proposals, as corporate pro-
gressives already have, to create a fiduciary duty owed to workers by the
board or proposals to secure board representation for workers. 168
Charging a committee of the board with overseeing the audit of a
company's financials does not magically create a "real" conscience for
the fictional entity. It establishes a process that we hope will produce
the same results as an integrity-seeking conscience, and it allocates to
specific individuals responsibility for seeing that the process is carried
01069 This type of reform creates a context in which individuals may
165 See generally El/WIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL
1860 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NIASSACHUSETIS (1954) (reviewing early American
corporate law); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corpora-
tion, 5 1. EcoN. Nisi. I, 2 (1945).
166" See Mitchell & Gabalclon, supra note 48, at 1657.
167 Sec Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1198-202 (describing new statutes and regulations
governing the role of the audit committee).
168 See, e.g., Alfred F. Collard, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 Micit. L. REV. 941,
952 (1977); Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Aleans, 22
141LCa. J, L. REFORM 19, 73-77 (1988); Katherine Van Isiezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate
Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging- Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. Rix. 73, 158-59 (1988).
169 Consistent with the notion of fiduciary responsibilities on the part of individual
agents, are requirements that particular officers certify the corporation's financial state-
ments. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777-78
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A.); Order Requiring
the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21 (a) (1) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Order 4-460 ( June 27, 2002).
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act, as well as an occasion for them to do so; moreover, it signals a pub-
lic commitment that may have an acculturating effect on actual behav-
ior. Thus, although this type of reform cannot assure its desired re-
sults, it should increase the chances that the desired results will occur.
By analogy, one can imagine the creation of board corporate
conscience committees charged with such goals as assuring the fair
treatment of workers, good stewardship of the environment, and
other goals. Insofar as creation of such committees would institution-
alize process, create context and occasion, locate responsibility with
individuals, and signal public commitment, it would seem that at least
some progress toward the specified goals would be forthcoming.
The conscience committee proposal obviously is inspired by the
traditional "corporation as fictional human" imagery—an attempt to
bring Pinocchio to life with the help of jiminy Cricket. It might, with
some effort, be made palatable to contractarians in either of two ways.
First, contractarian analyses of corporate functioning typically (but not
inevitably) concede that corporations should comply with law,"° and
that law external to corporate functioning properly may take account
of public goals."' If a public goal of worker fairness and the like is ar-
ticulated and a corporation will be penalized for failure to comply,
then implementing a conscience committee proposal could be viewed
as not. too controversial, particularly if implementation of the proposal
is itself enough to avoid the penalty, as is discussed below.
Second, contractarians frequently characterize the "best" corpo-
rate law as providing the "best" . set of default rules—those that the
parties would negotiate for themselves most frequently (hut which still
may be negotiated around). 172 Surely many corporate constituents
would bargain willingly that matters of public interest should be taken
into account, at least. to the extent consistent with their own interests.
Indeed, some evidence of this is provided by the steady growth of so-
cial responsibility investment funds.'" Getting these matters on the
table for purposes of examination surely should be acceptable.
If a conscience committee's role is one of gathering information
and exposing possibilities, there are still theoretical oxen to be gored
17° Fische!, supra note 164, at 1271.
171 Id. at 1272.
172 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
175
	 Williams, supra note 149, at 1287 (describing "dramatic" increase in number of
mutual funds using social or environmental screens, and quantifying the assets under pro-
fessional management in the United States using social screening as nine percent of total).
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if constituents are presumed to be basically self-interested. 174 In this
view, if one constituency is sure that its current position will not be
improved by such considerations, at a minimum it must be assured
that there is some grey area to be claimed—areas in which that con-
stituency cannot be hurt but others can be helped. Investors must be-
lieve that workers' lives can be improved or the environment saved
without necessarily impairing profitability. Workers must believe that
the environment could be preserved without resulting in loss of jobs
in particular locations or general diminution in wages.
Obviously, behavioral economics has something to say about
these matters. Taking the studies and conclusions of this school at
face value, 175 it would seem obvious that corporate constituents
should not object to the creation of a conscience committee—the in-
sertion of a conscience "step" in corporate process.
Adherents of the team production model similarly should raise
few objections. If the interests of all those with team-specific inputs
are to be considered by the board,' 76 establishing a committee of the
board to do so explicitly would seem to be desirable. It is true, how-
ever, that the proposal would press the outer limits of the team pro-
duction model by its grant of standing to the environment, a consid-
eration not usually accommodated specifically by the model.
To the extent that the conscience committee proposal would go
further—contemplating consideration of interests even of those with-
out team-specific inputs, two points may be made. First, consideration
of those so far removed from the corporation and its operations as to
have no discernible team-specific inputs (such as orphans in some
other country) is squarely in the realm of corporate philanthropy, the
permissibility of which team production scholars claim in support of
their postulations.'" Second, because corporate philanthropy is, in
fact, currently the subject of specific consideration of many corporate
boards, 178 it is probably unnecessary to put it on the plate of the con-
science committee. It is, in fact, the corporation's routine interactions
174 As indicated earlier, self-interest of the participants in business enterprise is a basic
assumption of the con tractarian approach. See sources cited supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
"5 See sources cited supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.176 See sources cited supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
177 Sec sources cited supra notes 56, 63-66 and accompanying text.
im See generally Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Prob-
lem of Comporale Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 586-87 (1997) (discussing corporate
philanthropy and suggesting its mandatory disclosure).
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with workers, environment, and so forth that more often are raised by
those with social responsibility concerns.'"
B. Point and Countopoint
It is entirely possible that the simple addition of a conscience
committee could improve both the perception and reality of corpo-
rate social responsibility. If people observe a step of corporate process
designed to consider responsibility issues it may bring about a change
in values and attitudes about the goals of corporate life. 180 It also is
possible, however, that creation of a committee will appear so hack-
neyed and so procedure-bound as to disappoint both the cynical and
those in search of inspiration. At this point, both failures and suc-
cesses in the operation of audit committees will be critical to debate,
as will future proposals for enhancing their operation.
There are, moreover, several criticisms to be leveled at a corporate
conscience committee proposal. Two are shared with audit committee
proposals and some are not. The first criticism to be directed at both
types of committee-based reform is that they are sops. 181 They may in-
deed hold out some promise of progress, but can this progress possibly
be enough? If it is not, isn't there some danger that the fanfare associ-
ated with the adoption and implementation of these proposals will
consume all available energy and attention, while something that
might be more far-reaching and ultimately successful is forgone?
The second shared criticisni is that by locating responsibility for
integrity and other conscience issues with specific individuals, other
individuals are relieved of that responsibility. 182 This effect could be
countered, perhaps, by requiring reports and other items from line and
staff alike, but. it is obvious that more work would need to be done.
The most important criticism that is not shared by audit and con-
science committee proposals is (no surprise) that conscience commit-
tee proposals are not generally in alignment with what is perceived tra-
179 Sec sources cited supra note 49 and accompanying text.
180 The roles of structure and nomenclature in shaping human thinking and behavior
have been the subject of much examination. Sec generally Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminists.
Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEx. j. WOMEN & I,. 1, 13-16
(1995) (discussing pitfalls and possibilities of symbols in corporate and securities law);
O'Connor, supra note 148, at 963 (discussing linguistic shaping of moral and social world);
Robert L. Palmer, When Law Fails: Ethics, Commerce, and Tales of Vrtue, 2 S. CAI,. bcrrtntsc.
U. 245,267-71 (1993) (discussing role of stories in shaping thinking and behavior).
161 See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 955.
182 See Gabaldon, supra note 180, at 19.
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ditionally as the goal of the corporation—to make money for share-
holders. The audit committee, by contrast, can be justified as an effort
to assess progress toward that goal, even though misstatement of par-
ticular financial statements might be useful instrumentally in protect-
ing the interests of shareholders at a particular moment in time.
To the extent that some instances of worker abuse (like some in-
stances of financial misstatement) are taken not for purposes of
profitability, but instead due to malignant self-interest, lack of fore-
sight or the like, some reconciliation of a corporate conscience com-
mittee proposal with the traditional corporate goal still can he
achieved. That is, if the mandate of the committee is to assure fair
treatment of workers, good stewardship of the environment and so
on, then consistent with profitability, inconsistency is definitionally
eliminated although a common animating spirit may be lacking.
The obvious method of providing a common spirit is to make
conscience profitable—to tie conscience issues squarely to corporate
profitability. Monetary penalties, such as those associated with viola-
tion of environmental laws, 183 are the most familiar method of ac-
complishing the linkage. These penalties, of course, are a form of ex-
ternal regulation rather than internal corporate reform.
C. The Internal/External Paradigm Re -visited
The internal/external line, then, is something to be revisited be-
fore moving on. Audit committee suggestions, which are based on the
notion that the entity must be truthful in dealing with its current and
prospective shareholders (and, incidentally, employees and creditors)
easily could take the form of internal regulation. Thus, if such com-
mittees were not formed or failed to function, then the shareholders
certainly could be given a remedy. If corporate conscience were re-
garded as an internal concern, because it involves primarily corporate
constituents, as redefined, then it could be left an internal matter,
with internal enforcement mechanisms or lack thereof. Thus, the
primary inside enforcement mechanism presumably would be litiga-
tion by constituents, however defined, brought to bear against the
members of the committee or the full board who fail in their duties.
When a committee's function is made a matter of external regula-
tory concern, the line between internal and external regulation is
I" See John 1V. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet? Corporate Liability and En-
vironmental Disclosure, 14 VA. EMT. Li. 225, 230-31 (1995) (discussing environmental
liability and arguing for increased environmental disclosure).
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breached, as it was by the reforms contemplated by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. 184 Thus, the functioning of audit committees was made a
concern of positive law, but shareholders were given no express rem-
edy for their process failttres. 185 In the course of this trespass it was
relatively easy both to identify a logical regulatory authority and to
provide that authority with clear guidelines for what audit commit-
tees were to be required to do. In part, this is because the result de-
sired—financial statements that are correct in all material results—is
clear, and a matter of traditional SEC concern. 188
A conscience committee proposal is, from an external enforce-
ment. perspective, more challenging. The SEC would have no compel-
ling relationship to the subject matter, and it is not clear exactly what
other regulatory authority would. Moreover, because it. is difficult to
specify exactly the outcome desired, specifying what an authority
should require the committee to do is problematic. Some amount of
fuzziness, such as that surrounding the requirements of fiduciary
duty,' 87 may be tolerable when it attends a doctrine to be enforced by
the self-interested. Permitting the same leeway in the case of official
enforcement could amount to a waste of resources.
For a moment, however, let its assume that we could devise a rea-
sonably tailored conscience committee-type proposal enforceable by
external authority. The process required presumably would be that
each publicly held corporation would have in place a conscience
committee charged with responsibility for assessing the impact of cor-
porate action (and inaction) on workers, creditors, consumers, host.
communities, and society more broadly. It would be charged with re-
porting to the full board at such times as would be meaningful for the
board's consideration of desirable action.
1 " See Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1198-99. The concept of corporate conscience
committees demands further line crossing, in that such committees would not be charged
with matters of direct benefit to the traditional interests of shareholders.
X97 	 to produce the desired result of accurate financial statements results in strict
liability for the corporation and what is akin to negligence-based liability for the directors.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204. § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A.).
I" See JoEl. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF 'nit: SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 71 (2d ed. 1995).
I R7 See Gabaldon, supra note 180, at 16-21.
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D. An Outsider View
From the perspective of "outsider" corporate critics, there are
strong reasons to believe that creation of such a committee cannot be
a complete solution to the perceived need to increase corporate so-
cial responsibility. Adoption of a regime mandating corporate con-
science committees may not be entirely far-fetched, but meaningful
reformation of board composition is much less likely. A proposal that
does no more than ritually invoke the services of the same group of
middle-aged white male and white male wannabes is, from this stand-
point, apt to fall prey to the criticism that it is a counterproductive
standard operating procedure.'
Given the concerns just expressed, it is appropriate to consider
how much further we really could go toward requiring specific results.
It is, however, a step to be taken only after pausing to elaborate on
why some sort of external result specification is, from an outsider's
perspective, important. Quite simply, although outsiders may tradi-
tionally have been excluded from political processes leading to the
adoption of positive law, 189 at this point in time their exclusion is no-
where nearly as complete as it is from corporate boardrooms. 19°
Suppose, then, that we could create a crime of corporate indif-
ference, the violation of which would result in corporate liability. The
elements would be as follows: first, that it be shown that corporate ac-
tion or inaction has contributed significantly to a state of affairs
("consequence") that we have, in advance, generally agreed as de-
plorable; second, that the consequence was reasonably foreseeable al
a time the corporation could have prevented it.
Specification of triggering consequences would be the first prob-
lem to overcome. Notwithstanding the lack of agreement about
whether some events are undesirable, there would be at least some
clear cases on which virtually everyone could agree. These presumably
would include loss of human life in the process of production, loss of
188 See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 955 (explaining criticism that both types of commit-
tee-based reform are sops).
189 See, e.g'., mr,NNETII J. ARROWN, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL. VALUES 2-3 (2d ed.
1963) (describing and criticizing law making process); DANIEL A. FARBER & P1111.11' P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23-24 (1991) (same); see also Martha Chamallas, The
Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REY. 579,580 (2001) (reviewing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM
P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR
‘VOItIEN IN AMERICA (1999) (discussing issues raised by political exclusion)); Mark Strasser,
Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and Me Constitution, 66
U. Coto. L. REV. 375,375-76 (1995) (same).
190 See sources cited supra notes 74,77.
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human life as the result of product use, widespread loss of employ-
"nen t, and material violation of existing environmental laws.
Almost without doubt there would be at least arguable benefits
offsetting or allegedly justifying even these undesirable consequences.
For instance, workers' lives may have been lost in constructing a dam
bringing hydroelectric power to a community that had no electricity.
Similarly, consumption of a vaccine may have led to the death of a few
and the survival of many more.
There are at least two ways to approach these arguable offsets. The
simplest is to ignore them; in light of the penalty proposed below, this is
neither draconian nor likely to bring the wheels of progress grinding to
a halt. The second is to permit the corporation a defense of adequate
consideration. This would require a showing that a report was pre-
sented by the corporate conscience committee and the matter was dis-
cussed specifically at a meeting of the board of directors at which a vote
was taken and the vote of individual directors recorded. There would
be no requirement of any specific cost-benefit analysis; the point is to
assure that at least some conscience matters become part of the regular
corporate process. Requiring the board to show that it discussed, in ad-
vance, the foreseeability of something that had already occurred when
the crime was charged, should also help in assuring that conscience
issues are not suppressed by "well-meaning" corporate employees and
that responsibility/accountability is not diffused by a corporate struc-
ture that separates those with enough information to discern the issues
from those with responsibility for making decisions. 191
Mention of corporate agents oilier than the board of directors is,
moreover, an appropriate reminder that the cheese need not stand
alone. Individual-based and entity-based approaches are not either/or
propositions. Both could be implemented. In other words, charging
individuals with conscience responsibilities (somewhat akin to requir-
ing officer certification of financials) could be a useful form of aug-
mentation. Thus, one easily can imagine a dramatic effect to provid-
ing that a corporate employee, or director, who becomes aware of
191 The perils of corporate diffusion have been well described by, for example, Brenda
S. limas & John Y Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer: Designated Felon or Legal Fie-
lion?, 25 Lov. U. Ctn. L.J. 169, 171 (1994); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a
Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 359-60 (1999); William
'S. Laufer, Cotpornte Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 648-51 (1994); Eli Leder-
man, Arad& for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation 7barard
Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 Ruin. Cwt. L. REV. 641, 668 (2000): and Jenni-
fer A. Quaid, The Assessment of Corporate Criminal Liability on the Basis of Corporate. Identity: An
Analysis, 43 McGILL LJ, 67, 69 (1998).
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foreseeable undesirable consequences and fails to bring them to the
attention of superiors, or to the conscience committee, is guilty of a
crime of indifference.
It seems, in fact, that an individually focused approach requiring
compliance by rank-and-file employees would be the most likely to
assure that issues were identified as an initial matter. Moreover, indi-
vidual-based approaches have had traditional appeal because the as-
sociated penalties have avoided punishing "innocent" shareholders. 192
They have been faulted for their ease of evasion by systems set up to
segment information-gathering and decision-making functions. 193 In
addition, because they do not connect shareholders to the conse-
quence of wrongdoing, they have no obvious role to play in enlisting
the corporate entity and/or market forces in monitoring or coercing
compliance with the legal norm in question.
E. Let the Punishment Fit the Crime
By contrast, monetary penalties assessed against corporate entities
have the effect of diminishing corporate and, presumably, shareholder
value. 194 Although this is deemed objectionable by some on the
grounds that many of the shareholders affected will not bear any re-
sponsibility for the wrongdoing and may not have been shareholders at
the time the wrongdoing occurred, 195 such penalties do give the market
some incentive to pay attention to whether the wrongdoing has been,
or is likely to be, committed by a particular corporation. As a related
matter, if a corporation can offer credible assurances that the wrongdo-
ing is less likely to occur there than at similarly situated companies,
then its shares rationally would command a relatively higher price.
If the penalty assessed against a corporation for the crime of cor-
porate indifference were forfeiture of all profits in excess of some in-
dustry average, then bag-holding shareholders would not be drastically
penalized. Moreover, unless a corporation signals that it has a substan-
tially effective compliance program, it would not be rational for pur-
chasing shareholders ever to pay a price that is based on projected
earnings in excess of the industry average. One might think that this
ti
192 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized In-
quiry into the Problem of Cwporate Punishment, 79 Mum. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981) (noting that
monetary penalties assessed against corporations penalize innocent shareholders).
193 See generally sources cited supra note 191 (describing possibilities of evasion and re-
lated issues).
191 Sec Coffee, supra note 192, at 401.
177 Sec id.
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would provide a significant incentive for compliance. This is true even
though corporations that do not expect. to be profitable or do not ex-
pect to be super-profitable may be less motivated than others. The clan-
ger of this latter phenomenon, however, could be addressed at least in
part by coupling entity- and individual-based approaches.
F. Investing lit Ethics
The excess profit-based penalty described above would be unlikely
to have drastic effects on overall market prices.'" This would, at any
rate, be the case if all of the shares traded in the market were subject to
the proposal. Given the existence of global markets, however, one easily
can imagine an argument that if American corporations were subjected
to laws governing .criminal indifference, capital would flee to more
happily indifferent climes. 197 This presumably would be both because
liability itself would! be feared and because corporate behavior with re-
spect to non-shareholders actually might change.
In general, the reasons given for American markets' magnetism
do not include a lust for extraordinary profits from operations.'"
During bubble times, motivations no doubt included a desire to gam-
ble with respect to profits that did not exist. 199 More often, the expla-
nations given have had more to do with the transparency of American
markets and their superior regulatory regime. 20° From these stand-
points, a proposal focused on disgorgement of excess profits should
offer little to fear.
196 At most, it might have an incidental moderating effect on future financial bubbles.
For discussion of financial bubbles generally, see, for example, Gabaldon, supra note 96, at
235-36 and SCHILLER, supra note 101, at 118-32.
197 Sec James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regula-
tory Competition, 55 LAw & CON • EMP. PROBS. 157,159-61 (1992) (describing capital flight
and international regulatory competition). Cf. Henry Hanstuann & Reinier Kmakman, The
End of History for Ccuporatc Law, 89 GEo. U. 439,440-43 (2001) (arguing that corporate gov-
ernance structures will converge across developed economies upon the Anglo-American,
"shareholder-oriented" model).
198 The most usual explanation of the relative attraction of the United States capital mar-
kets has to do with financial transparency. Sec, e.g., SEC Commissioner Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., A
Securities Regulator's Top Accounting and Auditing Priorities for 1998, Remarks at the Na-
tional Conference on Current SEC Developments of the American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants (Dec. 9, 1997), at hup://wwwsec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1997/spch198.txt.
199 See generally Gabaldon, supra note 96, at 229 (discussing gambling and the creation
of market bubbles).
200 see, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure, 96 CULLA!. L. REV. 1335, 1340-41 (1996).
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More problematic is the question of jurisdiction of the proposal. If
it applied to corporations chartered in America, it indeed might have
the effect of encouraging offshore incorporation.241 If the proposal ap-
plied to those corporations chartered in America, those selling their
shares in America, and those doing some dollar amount of business in
America, then opportunities for evasion obviously would be reduced.
Regulation to this extent might appear to be a financially preclusive
undertaking, but it quite arguably could be made self-funding.
CONCLUSION
The problem addressed by this Article is the lack of corporate
regard for the concerns of non-shareholders and the non-financial
concerns of shareholders themselves. This is a problem that has been
addressed by corporate progressives for over a decade. It renews the
call at a time when corporate conscience issues have been submerged
in concern for corporate integrity. It extends the call by observing
that the prior recommended reforms largely have been appeals to a
traditionally empowered group which may have perilously little un-
derstanding of the lives of others. Appealing to this group without a
careful attempt to structure its exercise of discretion seems perilous at
best, perverse at worst. An appeal based on influencing that discre-
tion through risk of disgorgement of excess profit may seem both
cynical (in that it makes use of a motivation that at least some unem-
powered will deplore) and incomplete (in that some details are left to
be addressed). It may, in addition, seem impractical, particularly at
this integrity-panicked moment in time.
The author pleads guilty on all counts, but recommends, "Give a
little whistle, and always 0 your conscience be your guide. "202
201 Seesources cited supra note 197.
202 PINOCCHIO (Walt Disney Studios 1940).
